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Abstract 
Sacrifice, solidarity, and social decadence were essential themes not only for Patočka's philosophical 
work, but also for his personal life. In the "Varna Lecture" sacrifice is characterized uniquely as the 
privation of a clear telos, as counter-escapist, and as sutured to a comportment of finite life that is 
non-causal and non-purposive. In his Heretical Essays a similar hope is expressed to extract mean-
ingfulness from use-value, and to deploy a Socratic and Christian "Care for the Soul" that can coun-
teract the decadences of our age.  These interests and developments of the practice and notion of 
sacrifice point to Patočka's double-hereticism, both of the post-industrial age of technological ad-
vancement, and of what had become the unthought-through (and therefore taken for granted) of the 
Christian tradition. In both senses, his theory of sacrifice is not unlike that of St. Paul, who saw the 
necessity of counter-acting the decadence and pompousness of the Corinthians by calling them to 
become "scum of the earth."  
This helps reveal how sacrifice presumes, in general, an operative notion of waste, and this paper 
seeks to lend further understanding to the relation between solidarity and sacrifice by developing, 
from out of Patočka's own work, precisely how waste figures prominently in such a relation. Waste 
may be refused by merit of being deemed to have no value; waste can mark a layer of expenditure of 
using "something up" in a way that overlooks its societal surplus; and waste could depict whatever is, 
like a wasteland, uncultivable and barren. Waste then is employed in the essay as a heuristic tool for 
understanding how the normalization of the relation between solidarity and sacrifice is in need of 
being inverted, and how this inversion has consequences also for how solidarity can be considered in 
relation to atonement.  
Keywords: Patočka, phenomenology, atonement, waste, heretiticism 
 
 
1. Introduction 
"Wasteland" 
April is the cruelest month, breeding  
Lilacs out of the dead land, mixing  
Memory and desire, stirring  
Dull roots with spring rain.  
T.S. Eliot, 1922 
 
Atonement is at-one-ment. What at first seems like banal word play indeed remains 
rooted in an etymology – Atonen, to be at-one (perhaps modeled on the Latin adunare, to 
unite), combines ad with unum, and (post 1300) concerns the melding of two parties into a 
unique social accord (adunare). Atonement eventually (from early 1500) depicted a condi-
tion or series of actions that resulted in fraternity, and in a more theological sense (from 
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early 1600) became a matter of re-union or reconciliation after humankind's great wrongs 
due to a propitiation of the offended God. 
One underlying preunderstanding that goes along with any understanding of atone-
ment is that in order for any such reunion to occur, something must be laid to waste or 
sacrificed. The Hebrew korban is used in the Old Testament for sacrifice, and expresses the 
idea of an approaching or "bringing near" to a place of interaction with God in the temple – 
likely at an alter – via a ritual of "purification." In the Book of Isaiah the loss of meaning of 
the sacrificial slaughtering of animals is deeply bemoaned since atonement (Zebah) had 
become taken for granted, which led to a particular kind of political disorder the messiah-
to-come eventually would restore. In the New Testament a radical shift is made in an un-
derstanding of atonement through shifting to the use of the word "ransom" (ἱλάσκομαι  
hilaskomai) –  an atoning, propitiating, and forgiving sacrifice that makes for reconciliation 
of social bonds (Καταλλαγή, katallagé).  Ransom covered the debt owed to God for con-
tributing to evil1 as Christ "came to serve, and give his life as a ransom for many." (Mark 
10:45).2 Christ's sacrifice amounted to the greatest waste or expenditure ever possible: God 
Godself (the irreducibly highest of values ever to be evaluated) is discarded vehemently 
from the social sphere. Early Christians thus stopped performing the tradition of animal 
sacrifice because they deemed it no longer necessary for solidarity and atonement (a scan-
dal to the prevalent religious traditions).3  The end of scapegoating is one thing that makes 
Christianity "the religion of the egress from religion." (Gauchet 1999, 40)  
One could venture to suggest that the 20th century marks the return of forms of a 
religionless scapegoating – to destroy one individual for socio-economic grounds – but in a 
more effervescent, implicit, and culturally-embedded form. In every attempt to be no longer 
Christian, global capital has reinstituted scapegoating in a way that its mechanisms seek the 
benefit of its function while discarding the husk of religion and its hopes of sacrifice to 
strengthen social bonds. Although such a theory never was introduced by Jan Patočka, 
                                                          
1 Compare here Isaiah 53:10 with Mark 10:45, especially the use of "in the place of many." See also 
Isaiah 43:3 for this understanding of "ransom" or kÿper in the context of other nations being given in 
exchange for Israel (also see Kim, 1983, 57). 
2 Cf. Hebrews 2:17: "For this reason [Jesus] had to be made like his brothers in every way, in order 
that...he might make atonement [hilaskesthai] for the sins of the people." Then in Romans 3:25, Paul 
claimed: "God presented him as a sacrifice of atonement, through faith in his blood." The verbs "pro-
pitiate" or "atone," hilasterion, are used by the apostle John, referencing Christ's death as 
an hilasmos (I John 2:2, and 4:10).  
3 For example, the rituals of Christianity – baptism and communion, e.g. – replace animal and scape-
goating sacrifices. Paul claimed we are to no longer sacrifice in these ways. Jesus "cleansing of the 
temple" in the gospel of John was an act that began the process of reinstituting solidarity and com-
munion. 
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anyone familiar with his work would not find it too surprising, as the interplay between 
sacrifice, solidarity, and a critique of modern European society remained essential for his 
work. Patočka enacted a kind of double-hereticism: First, he was a "heretic" of modern, 
industrial life in part because he drew attention to how society had taken for granted the 
role of sacrifice and taking-the-place-of-another. Patočka enacted an understanding of sacri-
fice that amounted to a paradoxical, non-economic, non-utilitarian, and counter-utopian 
vision of becoming a reject in a time of crisis instantiated by a certain industrialization of 
humankind. As a Czech dissident and original signatory of the Charter 77 civil rights 
movement in the 70's, his life was caught in the firefights of the post-world war amidst civil 
unrest and the struggle for liberation from Soviet occupation, and this first hereticism con-
tributed to his becoming a philosopher not only in a time of crisis, but of crisis itself.   
Second, he also was a "heretic" of the Christian tradition: here the theme of sacrifice 
again became a dominant one because he witnessed the radical attempt in the Czech Repub-
lic to extract Catholicism from its culture. In the 1940's he furnished a genealogy of this 
shift taking place in Europe more broadly (which he traced back to 15th century; c.f. 
Patočka 2006, 77), and ultimately concluded that there still remain "unthought-through" 
aspects of Christianity dispossessed of its religion "after the end of Christianity," with "sac-
rifice" figuring prominently among those forms of life in need of being thought-through 
(Hagedorn 2015, 10). In this sense he was a heretic of Christianity, for what called itself 
"Christian" had forgotten its core intelligibility – sacrifice.  In the "Varna Lectures" Chris-
tian sacrifice is characterized as the privation of a clear telos, as in need of being distin-
guished from escapism, and as an experience in which the sacrifice is sutured to the sacri-
ficee's mode of being.  Christian sacrifice teaches that willing sacrificees care about a cer-
tain comportment of finite life itself that is non-causal, non-deterministic, and auto-resistant 
to playing by the rules of the industrial age in which we find ourselves still today.   
These two, not so easily distinguishable hereticisms (of modern industrial life, and of 
the Christian tradition) coalesce perfectly in his two major tasks of The Heretical Essays – 
both to develop a new interpretation of "history" via a necessary distinction between purpose-
lessness and meaningfulness, and to deploy a simultaneously Socratic and Christian "Care for 
the Soul" with the hopes of counteracting the societal pressures of decadence; pressures that 
have left us all placated and powerless to alter our own course in history. It is in this sense of 
being counter-decadent that his work is stunningly reminiscent of St. Paul's condemnation 
of the pompous and splintered Corinthians in needed of becoming the "scum of the earth" (I 
Cor. 4:13). They were called to become peripsēma (περίψημα,) – a scum that atones; an 
"offscouring" of dregs or filth by merit of being used-up or becoming a "waste" or rejec-
tion. This word peripsēma (like the grotesque remains of an exfoliation or shave) is used 
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only once in the New Testament, and in this case points to the necessity of an expiatory 
sacrifice that, in its counter-decadence, is the core of atonement. 
The goal of the remainder of this paper first is to introduce in greater detail Patočka's 
doubly-heretical notion of sacrifice, and second, to engage the notion of "waste" as a heu-
ristic tool for contextualizing the "unthought" space between Christian sacrifice and solidar-
ity today, in an age when western society thinks itself to have pulled the fish-hook of reli-
gion from its mouth. Despite any attempt to discard it, there is always a running theory of 
(at least quasi-religious) atonement and sacrifice that enervates a given society, and "waste" 
may help understand that relationship. Waste has varied definitions, as what is unused, 
unproductive, or unwelcomed and therefore cast from oneself or society. Traced to its Latin 
origination in Vastus, it concerns what is refused by merit of being deemed of no value, 
may mark a layer of expenditure of being-used-up, or may depict whatever is, like a vast 
wasteland, an uncultivable, barren, and open expanse.4 Waste, at least from a more phe-
nomenological interpretation, is a product of one's activity; as deemed the-out-of-place (c.f. 
Douglas 1966).  
 
2.  Patočka's Notion of Sacrifice in the Varna Lectures and Heretical Essays 
 
2.1. Sacrifice and Modern Decadence 
It is in regards to the overcoming of a kind of Christian abyssal devastation of sacri-
fice through which I want to interpret Patočka's theory of sacrifice in the Varna lectures.  
Many others (Hagedorn, Evink, Dodd, et. al.) have described in great detail the overall 
thrust of Patočka's notion of sacrifice, so reflection here will be limited and focused. Essen-
tial, it seems, is the way the Varna lectures end:  "our imprisoned age must face itself," and 
sacrifice, a radical Christian sacrifice is one key to that.  The epic of sacrifice so easily can 
be reduced to a hidden/implicit expectation within a given society. Today for example, 
industrial advancements have drawn so many to sacrifice themselves in everyday life, 
whether through enframement (Heidegger), computerization (Latour) machination (Lyo-
tard), or technologization (Anders). Yet in every case, as each of the aforementioned think-
ers attest, these activities are not germane to the genuine flourishing of human life, but 
                                                          
4 "To waste away" is a temporal means of placating boredom in times of leisure. A "wasteland" is a 
barren place of death, lacking in vitality.  "Wastes" are refuse and garbage often too emotionally 
offensive even to discuss. Vastus also can refer to vaste (Middle French, post 1500's), which charac-
terizes what is immense, desolate, and unoccupied. The English word "De-vast-ation" unites these 
terms.  Another word that is of etymological relation is effuse.  From 1520's the Latin past participle 
adjective of effuses points to what is both "poured out" and to be vast, extensive, and broad". 
LABYRINTH Vol. 19, No. 1, Autumn 2017 
 
 
106 
 
rather benefit its proxy of technological apparatuses. These aspects of industrial life today 
embody empty, self-fulfilling, and vague themes of progress that shroud their most true 
functions, which are detrimental to the human good.  It is in a similar vein that Patočka 
bemoans how sacrifice no longer is powerful in our time, and that whenever sacrifice does 
become a theme of engagement, it ends up economized in terms of resources. We once 
again succumb to retreating into technological language. Technology becomes the means by 
which the enlightenment of man gets overly conceived, as well as a bad-faith sublimation in 
response to the social-self reproach exacted via sacrifices and victims in waging wars.  
A true understanding of sacrifice however, cannot be calculated in terms of power, 
is inherently paradoxical, and entails the radical experience of gain-via-loss in an inversion 
of power relations that involves a turning-away from the unproblematicity of "ordinary 
everydayness." Patočka endorses a particular form of Christian sacrifice as it differs from 
other religions of power, kingship, and authority-making. This kind of sacrifice is inherent-
ly social, in that neither no one person can embody it, nor one meaning underwrite it's mo-
tivity. Yet his theorization of Christian sacrifice is anti-telic in a way that also is anti-
escapist, suturing the sacrificee to its lived, ontological modality.  Christian sacrifice thus 
teaches that willing sacrificees care about a certain comportment of finite life itself that is 
non-causal, non-deterministic, and resistant to playing by the aforementioned rules of tech-
nological advancement.   Finally, while some think Patočka does not draw sharp distinc-
tions between "victims" and "voluntary sacrifices" (as neither the Czech Obět, nor the Ger-
man Opfer make such differentiation), his work seems to necessitate a distinction, unabash-
edly valorizing the latter; the willing, volitional choice to sacrifice.  
 
2.2. The Role of History 
Patočka's best-known work The Heretical Essays in the Philosophy of History was 
an application of his dissident spirit to the core thought patterns of modern life in part re-
sponsible for the many atrocities of the 20th century.  This work challenged many of the 
prevailing and accepted contradictions of his generation and culture in regards to history, 
such as the contradiction that history determines the past according to which we are inextri-
cably bound to operate, yet that its annals are composed of the detailed descriptions of the 
acts of free subjects. He sought to arrive at a synthesis that honors both of these driving 
conceptions in order to allow social actors to be original/singular, yet in a way that retains 
social meaning on a macro-institutional level.  Within a perhaps more phenomenological 
analysis, history is a matter of self-construal: histories, traditions, and narratives are in 
constant upheaval within consciousness, and trying to rely on a particular tradition or event 
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is like "trying to hold on to the waves in a shipwreck." It is precisely this view of history 
that leads Patočka, in his 1952 essay "Time, Myth, and Faith" (Patočka 2015), to conclude 
that a true and free faith does not cling to an objective-relative meaning.  The antinomy that 
generally goes unrecognized is that those who cling to myths and traditions seek with all of 
their energy a "pure origin", and in fact are clinging to but historically relativized meanings 
more in accord with a near-hedonistic escapism than with the teachings of Christ. Faith is 
opposed to such escapism, as the very idea of God has called the faithful to realize history, 
not simply be passive subjects to its many developments. 
 But this understanding of becoming radical shapers of history is a far cry from a 
call to become its superhero. Patočka's double-hereticism concerns the attempted refor-
mation of both a secularized socialism, and a trenchant, Czech, cultural Christianity via a 
new understanding of myth as history itself. A flawed relation with history, in many re-
spects, is at the core of the modern mind. Shaped against the backdrop of Karl Löwith's 
critique of teleological history in general and Christian eschatology in particular (Löwith 
1957; cf. Hagedorn 2015), Patočka-the-phenomenologist understood how easily humans 
operate with the tendency to make the exception the rule; to integrate the truly outstanding 
into the naturalness of everyday life irrespective of such escapist views. Comparable to 
Arendt's view, the everyday absorbs how human acts are in fact given their purpose (not the 
other way around).  Patočka remained disheartened by the fact that the majority of people's 
lives are spent either concerning themselves with their survival, or with the forms of every-
day function that they have learned during this very survival process. For example, technol-
ogy becomes an end in itself; work becomes a pleasure that fulfills our "orgiastic" drives 
for excitement; the mysterium tremendum is limited to the enchantment this world is capa-
ble of furnishing. The original synthesis of a new meaning of history at which Patočka 
sought to arrive ran counter to the modern insistence upon conflict and competition.  His 
replacement or "heretical" understanding of history called upon, in the face of provocation, 
the revivification of a form of Christian "sacrifice" that grew from the solidarity of "the 
shaken" – those truly responsible persons who never forget the events that have shaped 
their lives, and therefore might respond to any crises that may befall them.  
In addition to the profound and original meaning of Christian sacrifice, then, is the 
call to overcome the world. History only is made – it is not merely by observing or "know-
ing" (these highly enlightened means of more passive transcendental engagement) the truth, 
but rather by struggling for an inner historicity of the self. Christianity allows us not to be 
mere subjects of history, bound to the "information" given to its adherents from tradition 
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and myth.5 The present, decadent, "Post-Christian" era runs antithetical to what Patočka 
fashioned to be a synthetic, Christian-Socratic "care for the soul," which is a taking of "or-
giastic" responsibility for one's own Bildung via radical individualization. If Christ has set 
one free, then this freeing perhaps is most importantly a freeing from political, cultural, and 
social imaginaries that seek to blackmail and entrap us. This freedom is from the metaphysi-
cal matrixes (not unlike Adorno's "substitute images of the divine") that seek to govern every 
thought away from true care and responsibility via myth and the history of origination. 
This furnishes an essential backdrop for a very particular observation about Chris-
tian life: 
the overcoming of everydayness assumes the form of the care for the salvation of the 
soul which won itself in a moral transformation, in the turn in the face of death and 
death eternal; which lives in anxiety and hope inextricably intertwined, which trem-
bles in the knowledge of its sin and with its whole being offers itself in the sacrifice of 
penance. (Patočka 1996, 108) 
Christianity's yet-to-be-thought and unsurpassed greatness is its propensity as a resource to 
overcome everydayness by promoting the caring about one's salvation from imminent 
death.  This is enacted and engaged not by directly caring for oneself, but by sacrificing 
oneself in a way that the self-sacrifice in fact amounts to the soul's getting cared for.  
 
3. Deepening a Theory of Waste via Patočka's Heretical Essays 
 
This leads to the potential to exfoliate from Patočka's work some deeper reflection 
on the notion of waste, and this will be accomplished through four topoi.  
 
3.1. History and Waste 
A first reflection on waste points to a particular kind of insignificance one is called 
to attain in the act of sacrifice. The will to be significant is to be abandoned in the act, and 
the life of the truly Christian sacrifice, today, tends to be rejected automatically for it gets 
misunderstood (like religion in general) as insignificant. Religion often is deemed unim-
portant at worse, or it gets relegated to a private option at best, thus indirectly reinstituting 
its lack of importance. It is in this context that a reflection on "waste" might be instructive: 
                                                          
5 See also Joas (2014) who questions this notion of optional, free-choice faith, which has set-off 
occidental reason on its individualistic, secular trajectories.  Contemporary Christianity consequen-
tially has led to a stark, often extreme individualization of belief, which in its secularized form is 
popularized according to petit-freedoms or, as Peter Sloterdijk once called them, "whims." 
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waste not only as what is passionately and willfully rejected, but also what is quietly dis-
missed to have no value, significance, or meaningful intelligibility. Even among the self-
proclaimed "religious," the non-implicit and non-integrative conception of religious life 
leaves it in a precarious situation that leads to at least two possible outcomes: either it be-
comes insignificant (as just described) or it gets commandeered as an instrument. For ex-
ample, even though Habermas quite recently has called for a "post-secular" society, the 
conception of religion within such a schema can amount to a pragmatic instrumentalization 
of religion as a tool for creating humans more moral. This inadvertently runs the risk of 
leaving religion as a second-order pawn to any purposive, social good.   
Indeed, the contemporary rejections of Christianity today in this so-called "post-
secular age" are far more inconspicuous and subtle, which makes such rejections in fact all 
the more dangerous: Christianity no longer is seen as being anything unique or of value on 
its own terms, but instead, in being instrumentalized, can but one tactic in achieving a pur-
ported social/political/moral telos.  In other words, a post-secular acceptance of religion and 
the religious (so long as it and they are not "fanatics," of course) in contemporary society 
fact is a kind of rejection; namely, because it precludes from the very beginning the possi-
biliyt that it operates with a differential that makes any "real" difference on its own. In what 
seems to be a shift from secular to post-secular also comes a shift from outright rejection to 
implicit rejection.  To channel Patočka here, such interpretations of religious life can be 
counteracted only when a radical sacrifice initiates a new selflessness whereby one is 
aligned with what has become in a given society insignificance or waste itself.  "Christiani-
ties" must not succumb to their own instrumentalization towards a utopic vision; otherwise 
the sacrificing of oneself for another and the solidarity it creates does not get unrealized. 
 
3.2. Solidarity with Meaninglessness  
A second aspect of Patočka's Heretical Essays relevant to interpreting waste is the 
recognition that what is found meaningless is precisely that according to which the highest 
degree of intelligibility is accorded. For Patočka, "Human acts can be purposeless, yet be 
meaningful." (Patočka 1996, 54). Following Heidegger, the activity of making-sense or 
making-intelligible is a core human endeavor and the produced intelligibilities of such 
activity are irreducible to purposiveness. This is a counter-industrial meaningfulness, sense, 
or intelligibility. Contrariwise, within our present age, the societies in which we gain our 
present forms of meaning-making have led not only to a social understanding of how "pur-
pose is causality raised up to the region of the meaningful…"; that is, to how meaningful-
ness has been reduced to purposiveness, but also to how purpose itself has become the 
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ultimate meaning that in fact is incredibly purposeless! The result being that there is no 
purpose to purpose itself, yet the insistence (or obsession) with purposefulness today is 
affixed with a maximum meaningfulness.  A certain determinism has found a social concu-
bine in the synthesis between purpose and technology, which no longer only is a means, but 
has become an end in itself.  
One problem here is that this kind of telos-obsessed thinking disregards and auto-
rejects whatever is deemed to have no purpose.  Its seeming inverse claim, which may 
amount to a more probing insight, reveals how we operate with the tendency to give the pur-
poseful an ultimate meaningfulness in and of itself.  And what is meaningful, we most always 
conclude, deserves attention, energy, and perhaps even adoration.  In "man's search for mean-
ing" (to reappropriate Frankl) one arrives at purpose itself, which in a decadent society often 
unknowingly gets raised to the status of a "value" and therefore ushered into the company of 
truth, beauty, or justice. As Patočka concludes, values are not purposes or goals, but rather 
indicative of the meaningfulness of what is formulated as "autonomous qualities," according 
to which we live as if they were universal (Patočka 1996, 55). We are the bestowers of mean-
ings on things and – perhaps most importantly – it remains the task for man to be involved 
poetically in "bestowing meaning on the meaningless." (Patočka 1996, 57). 
 
3.3. Meaninglessness and Waste 
In another sense, meaninglessness is what presents itself as intelligible, yet is reject-
ed on the grounds that it has no place in conscious life and is not deserving attention. 
Whatever is meaningless slips through our entirely "normalized" meaning-given conceptu-
alizations of the world.  This is entirely consistent with how Patočka ends his Varna lec-
tures, claiming that "our imprisoned age must face itself" and that it now will take a radical 
Christian sacrifice to do so.  Patočka bemoans how sacrifice is no longer powerful in our 
time, and that whenever we do recognize sacrifice it ends up economized in terms of re-
sources (Patočka 2015, 20). The notion of sacrifice as such ends up getting lost once again 
in a technical and functional understanding of being.  
Instead, sacrifice should be understood as precisely that which challenges these cal-
culations and functions with a different form of life.6 In a more prescriptive element, the 
Christian life lived (according to Paul's mandate to being scum of the earth) should involve 
                                                          
6 For Patočka, today we flee from sacrifice and "into a technical understanding of being which prom-
ises to exclude this experience and for which there exists nothing like a sacrifice, only utilization of 
resources" and "Thus sacrifice represents a persistent presence of something that does not appear in 
the calculations of the technological world."  (Patočka 1989, 337) 
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one's closer association not simply with the meaningless, but also those actions, places, and 
aspects of life that serve no utilitarian purpose in life whatsoever, and therefore are capable 
of being subversive in their enactment of meaninglessness. Here again an understanding of 
waste can help draw attention to the essential role the making-intelligible-of-
meaninglessness might play. 
 
3.4. The Care for the Soul 
A final aspect of Patočka's work that bears significance for conceiving the role of 
waste within sacrifice is his version of the "Care for the Soul."  To care for the soul is to 
reject any essentialist, never-differentiating information that hides under the guises of truth 
in myth, which amounts to adequatio or correctness. Instead, caring is born in an event to 
which one responds (e.g, St Paul's miraculous blindness and healing) by being "shaken" in 
a way that is powerful enough to shift the actor from being merely a passive observer and 
subject of history's movements, to becoming an alterer of them through a never-ending and 
dynamic inquiry and practice (Patočka 1989, 82).7 These inquiries and practices enact a 
direct devaluation of what the world claims to value. They result in counter-cultural move-
ments against what humans presuppose to be – by nature undebatably – good. These values 
range from climbing social ladders to attain better jobs, to keeping quiet and living unprob-
lematically in a corrupt social state.  
The care for the soul always entails a devaluing of how worth typically is attained, 
and it is in these regards that Christianity especially is instructive as the means of "devalua-
tion of this world by a 'true' world, of life [and] will..." (Patočka 1996, 97) To devalue is to 
become subsequently rejected by the worlds' forms of decadence that enable what a society 
thinks to be a smooth, effortless, unproblematic, and carefree functioning. Patočka prophe-
sied what he perceived to be a nascent and growing threat in Europe beginning in the 60's – 
we have begun a social "addiction to things" that only ends in "a decadent life, a life addict-
ed to what is inhuman by its very nature." (Patočka 1996, 113, 97) Decadence goes hand-
in-glove with increasing reliance upon the non-human. Instead, Christian life sutures the 
"care of the soul" to melete Thanatou, "care of death," which more accurately amounts to 
                                                          
7 Regarding the constant movement of such caring especially under the Greek conception. Patočka 
also claimed that the soul "is the origin of movement, it can only be understood in movement. The 
movement of the soul in its most proper sense of the world is precisely care for its very self." 
(Patočka 2002, 124) Continuing, "The proper, positive care of the soul is somehow the concluding of 
something that is sketched into the nature of the soul, but is not always explicitly captured." (ibid.; see 
also Findlay, 2002)  
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"care of life." (Patočka 1996, 105) Under Patočka's theorization, this care of death/life/soul 
can only result in one's becoming a sacrifice for the lives of other's.  
In particular, the Greek care for the soul is enriched by Christianity's adding to it an 
infinite, non-decadent care that at its core most simply seeks to know what it does more 
fully: 
the soul is by nature wholly incommensurate with all eternal being, that this nature 
has to do with its care for its own being in which, unlike all other existents, it is infini-
tely interested; and that an essential part of its composition is responsibility, that is, 
the possibility of choice and, in this choosing, of arriving at its own self – the idea that 
the soul is nothing present before, only afterwards, that it is historical in all its being 
and only as such escapes decadence. By virtue of this foundation in the abysmal dee-
pening of the soul, Christianity remains thus far the greatest, unsurpassed but also un-
thought-through human outreach that enabled humans to struggle against decadence." 
(Patočka 1996, 108). 
As it enriches the care for the soul via a radical sacrifice of the self, Christian life 
can slow down the grinding wheels of history in a way unique from other religious tradi-
tions.8 As he put it in Plato and Europe, a Christian care of the soul is "disengaged 
from…Greek dialectic" and this has consequences for how it understands authority and acts 
in relation to dogmas that "are not considered as something to be accepted blindly" alt-
hough "these dogmata have meaning." (Patočka 2002, 129) For Patočka Christian faith is 
the last hold-out in the struggle against social, political, and cultural decadence, but only in 
its renewed sense of sacrifice, that irreducible core of Christian life.   
Since the care for the soul occurs paradoxically by abandoning self-interests, it is a 
care for the death and therefore life of others that motivates acts that help lift individuals 
from decadence.  Decadent are those of us out of touch with our innermost understanding 
of the distinctions between functions, values, and meanings. And by merit of being distract-
ed by that which has captured and held in stasis our "orgiastic" search for the mysterium 
tremendum, we remain trapped in a simultaneously kenotic and consumptive relation with 
the forms of utility themselves. Care for the soul offers a unique freedom from the authority 
of the historically evolved, social norms that order our lives, which tend to be marked by an 
economically oriented obsession with function. Means of overcoming such obsessions 
entails forms of relation whereby one is more attuned to what escapes the oversight of func-
tion, whatever within such a system is deemed an insignificant and meaningless waste. 
                                                          
8 It is in this context that Hagedorn argues for how Derrida drew from Patočka in these regards in 
claiming that Europe must be emancipated from Athens and Rome in order to reach its full potential. 
Such a task can be accomplished only by being "fully Christian." (Hagedorn, 2015)  
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4.  Waste and Sacrifice 
 
It now becomes possible, via further insights from Patočka's Varna Lectures, to inte-
grate more carefully the intelligibility of the role of waste in the relations between sacrifice 
and solidarity today. While there are many paths one could take in such an effort, there are 
three conceptual notions that I find most convincing when thinking about waste alongside 
Patočka's Varna lectures. Waste in this case can be thought and distinguished according to 
Vastus' three pronged distinction: devastation, expenditure, and wasted. 
 
4.1. Devastation  
Once a sacrifice occurs, it comes with a radical experience of mourning what has 
been lost. What could have been can be no more, and the future of possibility in this sense 
is wasted. If it is the case that, as Patočka suggests, "Those who thus sacrifice themselves 
do not avoid finitude, nor do they seek admiration on that account...", (Patočka 338, 1989) 
then it also remains true that one must go through finitude, and the abysmal reality that it 
would entail without reliance upon any escapist narrative (Re: Löwith). Christ on the cross 
was estranged from union with neither man nor God. This lonely devastation is given voice 
in the sense of abandonment: Christ's "Father, why have you forsaken me?" marks the ex-
perience of a certain vastness and emptiness, which gets expressed in terms of loneliness.  
This points to how the sacrificee's life is one of a kind of devastation. The sacrificee 
does not come to expect a miraculous redemption in the act of sacrificing, or a form of "pay 
back" that would oblige a powerful God to bless the willing sacrificee. True sacrifice coun-
teracts the hope to tap-into divine power for its own good, and to bring "this power under 
an obligation."9 The lack of full divine activity for what at the time the sacrificee thinks to 
be good for him results in a kind of devastation of that for which a sacrificee somewhat 
naturally yearns – an exchange of goods for services. The sacrifice must be prevented from 
falling into economy by lacking a "return gift" or payment that would make for even a kind 
of enjoyment of the sacrifice. This could threaten to make for an easy sacrifice, the quality 
of which is not strained because there is a delayed gratification awaiting the sacrificee. The 
                                                          
9 For Patočka "An understanding of sacrifice might basically be considered that in which Christianity 
differs from those religions which conceived of the divine always as a power and a force, and of a 
sacrifice as the activity which places this power under an obligation. Christianity, as we might per-
haps think, placed at the center a radical sacrifice (…) and rested its cause on the maturity of the 
human being." (Patočka 1989, 338). 
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terror of devastation is part and parcel of the risk, faith, and abandon of sacrifice, which 
surrenders fairness, economy, and exchange.  
 
4.2. Expenditure 
It is in a similar sense that a willing sacrificee is not seeking recognition, complete-
ness, or fulfillment, but (among other things) a certain unconditional and total accomplish-
ment of giving in an indirect way. The sacrificee is not singularly focused upon one possi-
bility of comportment but many, as the very notion of directedness often is inflected in 
causal or technological terms. In the place of this economy of directedness, the sacrificee 
yields to something beyond some-things so as to become implicit, incarnate, and integrated. 
The sacrified-for is affirmed (which is not necessarily economical) in part because it calls 
for dedication as it retains the unique ability to not be appropriated economically in a total-
izing instrumentalization. This alone would be something worthy of sacrifice.  
Here one might be reminded of Bataille's notion of expenditure, which can point to 
both products of neoliberal waste (the bourgeois' buying and selling of useless adornment 
and jewelry, e.g.) as well as total abandonments of what one cherishes the most for a seem-
ingly a-rational "cause."  Bataille observed how Native American Potlatch festivals demon-
strated a "general economy" whereby a competition is initiated to out-give other tribes 
excessively, riskfully, and wastefully (see Bataille 1991).  One must "give it all away" to 
the point of wasting it. In this general economy "everything is put at stake" in a way com-
parable to Aztec scapegoating sacrifices, which are meant for a community to see its obses-
sion with "restricted economy."  Both readings reflect Bataille's tendencies to interpret the 
master/slave dialectic as an ultimately negating and abyss-leaping act in order to subvert 
economy.10  Although Bataille's understanding has come under critique for an over-
emphasis upon pure negativity, which counter-acts the gift of sacrifice (Derrida 1967), 
Bataille understood that a waste of expenditure is necessary in order for any sacrifice to 
take place. 
                                                          
10 Countering Bataille, Derrida insisted on an aneconomical nature of the gift of sacrifice (see Derri-
da1967). In what would become decades of work on the gift, Derrida's language and conception of 
"economy" originates in a deconstruction of Bataille's general economy, which does not allow for a 
"resolution" or return to self-consciousness and ultimately, absolute knowledge the Hegelian dialectic 
insists upon.  Bataille's exposition of economy fails because it ends in absolute negativity of death, 
and in "abstract negativity:" for "To rush headlong into death…one risks losing the effect and profit 
of meaning which were the very stakes one hoped to win." Bataille's excessive gift "can only utilize 
the empty form of the Aufhebung" (ibid.). 
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This helps qualify a definition of "waste" according to a certain logic of expenditure 
and excess.  In abandoning economy, one relates with the "something" of sacrifice via an 
affective expenditure, and Patočka seems accurate to think that it is precisely the "cost" of 
the sacrifice that certainly is not counted in any typical sense. This is because, as he claims, 
sacrificees have an entirely different focus: 
In giving themselves for something, they dedicate themselves to that of which it can-
not be said that it 'is' something, or something objective. The sacrifice becomes mean-
ingful as the making explicit of the authentic relation between the essential core of 
man and the ground of understanding which makes him human and which is radically 
finite, that is, which is no reason for being, no cause, no force. (Patočka 2015, 21)11  
This essential grounding is a kind of "weak" resistance that makes up the core of 
man and, especially in times of crisis, provides the motive to attempt the inversion of power 
relations. This is not unlike Gusdorf's (1948, 67) claim that "sacrifice puts us in the pres-
ence of a 'paradoxical' form of exchange," and inherently subverts power relations by an 
expenditure that counteracts what is straightforward and economical.12  
 
4.3. Wasted 
This leads to a third reflection upon waste as the experience of oneself-as-wasted.  
For Patočka, today we flee from sacrifice and "into a technical understanding of being 
which promises to exclude this experience and for which there exists nothing like a sacri-
fice, only a utilization of resources" and "thus sacrifice represent a persistent presence of 
something that does not appear in the calculations of the technological world." (Patočka 
1989, 337). The soul of Europe has lost touch with its deeper enervation, and sacrifice is a 
non-telic means of restoring frayed social bonds.  Sacrifices are irreducible to causes and 
fall outside the jurisdiction of utility and usefulness. In a sacrifice, there can be no praise of 
the input/output register (Lyotard). 
To become "a waste" is to be subjectivized according to a non-cultured space that is 
radically held in place by a certain hyper-naturalness. By opening oneself up to death, and 
                                                          
11 Patočka employs a late-Heideggerian ontology, one where the relation with being as Dasein be-
comes a matter of dynamism that matches the "not-hereness" of Dasein. Dasein, like the gift, is never 
"here," and Patočka then applies this to sacrifice. One does not sacrifice for some "thing" but for that 
which already exceeds what one thinks to be the motivity or telos of the sacrificed.  
12 Sacrifice is an a priori structure within the affirmation of personal life, and one remains caught 
between the economic and counter-economic. Earlier, Gusdorf claims that "sacrifice is the realization 
of a kind of economy between man and the gods, but the economic sense of this economy masks in 
reality a deeper sense." (Georges Gusdorf 1948, 86) 
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to the non-ordinariness of life, one commits the most natural act (the natural, the uncondi-
tioned, and the uncultured here all are related) of living by yielding oneself truly to what 
one lives for. In the case of a willing sacrificee, one likely knows that eventually their sacri-
fice will be forgotten, and this amounts to the experience of being wasted: the sacrificee is 
to be cast from the social norm, is not to be re-integrated into the whole, and is not to be 
saved or her dignity restored. Yet it is in this role of being-sacrifice that today one might 
perform the role of being a de-socializing, sliding signifier (not unlike the Aztec or Native 
American practices) in the registers of economical calculation and industrialization.  The 
sacrificee may find consolation in being – as Patočka knew all to well – an embodiment of 
social waste that issues the persistent call for a re-evaluation not simply of all values as 
Nietzsche so eloquently sought, but of a society's non-values: of what it rejects and is will-
ing to not save or die for. 
 
5. Scum of the Earth 
 
These reflections on waste hopefully remain irreducible to a straightforward negativ-
ity through which one must persevere in order to achieve some positive social outcome. 
Sacrifice is not a direct affirmation of the negative, a "tarrying with the negative," or even a 
dialectic of negation and affirmation. Patočka's reflections go deeper than these tendencies 
by pointing to atonement as the key for solidarity via (as interpreted throughout this essay) 
a radical relation with waste. Despite the sacrificees' attitude of ambivalence necessary 
towards an instrumentalized social outcome, she must heed the warnings that the lives of 
early Christian martyrs present in their imitation of Christ's sacrifice. For the sacrifice to 
have any productive outcome (again, beyond any hopes of utility) it still needs to have 
some affirmative return to that which was sought for atonement.  If Christianity is to offer 
anything radical for today it must challenge its economically oriented predicates that so 
often easily ensnare it. Far too often theories of Christian atonement presume a certain 
Divine economy with penal justice as the principal and overarching means. Instead Christ 
atoned for any further needs of scapegoating and paying penance. Yet it occasionally gets 
presumed falsely that sacrifice (along with scapegoating) also is to be discarded from Chris-
tian practice. However, a true sacrifice can protest against our "technical understandings" of 
everyday life, and it indeed can teach "our outwardly rich yet essentially impoverished age 
to face itself."  Patočka's renewed, Christian/Hellenistic understanding of sacrifice involves 
an "abysmal deepening of the soul" that employs a dedication to being-wasted so as to 
defect from the ever-widening reach of technologization and its fraying social bonds.  
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In this article13 I have had no other pretense than to reveal some of the ways an un-
derstanding of waste might thicken a conceptualization of the relation between solidarity 
and sacrifice. The relation between sacrifice and solidarity generally is presumed to operate 
pragmatically: one sacrifices for whomever one already has solidarity, fraternity, or friend-
ship. In other words, this kind of sacrifice is a natural, if not evolutionary product of such 
solidarity.  This would mean that there is very little that is special about sacrifice, as it is 
not so incredibly difficult to sacrifice oneself (a parent protecting a child for example) for 
someone with whom a bond already has been established.  Instead, given the a-telic and 
waste-oriented qualifications of sacrifice to which this paper has drawn attention, such a 
pragmatic, if not utilitarian understanding of this sacrifice/solidarity relation needs to be 
corrected.  Patočka's understanding of Christian sacrifice (the sacrifice to end all scapegoat-
ing as well as any telic orientation), alongside an understanding of how waste figures into 
its operations, points us to how sacrifice comes ontologically prior to solidarity, namely 
because solidarity must be prevented from becoming an end or purpose, by which sacrifice 
would be reduced to a mere means. 
 Instead, the inverse seems more accurate: solidarity should be predicated upon sac-
rifice. This necessity hopefully also draws attention to the role of waste in the inversion of 
power relations Patočka underscored. The three-fold qualification of waste (wasted, ex-
penditure, and devastation) and its aforementioned description highlight this paradoxical 
value of sacrifice, and may help prevent sacrifice from reverting to instrumentality. Recog-
nizing the role of waste within sacrifice helps take it one step further so as to prevent "soli-
darity" from becoming a telic end of the sacrifice. If it become a telic end, then once again, 
sacrifice takes on a purpose of function. Waste, as closely related to the "Unconditioned" 
may serve a divine function by de-culturing such tendencies. This helps remove sacrifice 
from being but a means of achieving some (seamlessly weaved and implicit) ideal of a 
perhaps false understanding of solidarity as a form of social balance. 
 Indeed, if one accepts the aforementioned inversion of the solidarity/sacrifice rela-
tion, then this also calls for another understanding of solidarity. It is not merely the tranquil, 
beautiful soul of a peaceful social relation. Instead, it should be seen more like an atone-
ment, one that has has gone through the experience of forsakenness in a way that the natural 
flow of the will to "exist unproblematically" (Patočka 1996, 13) is suspended. As Patočka 
understood, solidarity, like atonement must overcome its being presumed synonymous 
                                                          
13 This article was conceived and written with the generous support of two research grants from 
the Austrian Science Fund (FWF). It was conceived within the framework of the project "The 
Return of Religion as a Challenge to Thought" (I2785) and concluded in the project "Secular-
ism and its Discontents: Toward a Phenomenology of Religious Violence" (P 29599).  
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moreso with an "unproblematicity" and the many persistent demands of our carnal and 
mundane livelihood. And this is one reason why sacrifices must also be embedded cultural-
ly in order to atone for our technological decadence that pays no attention to the affects of 
waste or "non-values." St. Paul's call to become "scum of the earth" is perhaps more rele-
vant today than it ever has been. Yet it is perhaps only when 1) reason runs aground, 2) 
technologically decadent means of everyday life are suspended, and 3) the escapisms that 
so easily entrap our theological imaginaries are placed at bay that a sacrificee might find 
her identity finally where it belongs: between purposelessness and infinity. 
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